Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 Ontological Status of the four Natures in Jabir ibn Hayyan’s Natural Philosophy: Its differences and similarities with antecedent traditions Ontological Status of the four Natures in Jabir ibn Hayyan’s Natural Philosophy: Its differences and similarities with antecedent traditions 1 18 106541 10.48308/jipt.2025.240669.1649 FA Amin Motavallian Department of History of Science, Faculty of History and Philosophy of Science, IHCS, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 07 14 The four natures hold a special and important place in the natural philosophy theories of Jabir ibn Hayyan, to the extent that his natural philosophy can be termed "the physics of natures." Few primary texts attributed to Jabir can be found that do not discuss the natures in detail. From a historical perspective, there are many similarities between Jabir's theories and those of natural philosophers before him regarding the four natures; however, some of his claims raise the hypothesis that Jabir's theory is distinct, particularly in terms of the ontology of the natures. The basis of Jabir's view, influenced by his thoroughly pragmatic perspective, is that qualities are independent, embodied entities that, like physical materials, can combine with one another or be separated from each other. Nevertheless, this hypothesis—the distinctiveness and novelty of Jabir's claim—requires analyzing and comparing his detailed theories on the subject of natures with the prominent and well-known physical traditions preceding him, namely the Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic, and Neoplatonic traditions of natural philosophy. The main issue of this article is to explain the ontological status of the four natures in Jabir's thought and to assess the degree of its distinctiveness based on texts and content related to the subject. The four natures hold a special and important place in the natural philosophy theories of Jabir ibn Hayyan, to the extent that his natural philosophy can be termed "the physics of natures." Few primary texts attributed to Jabir can be found that do not discuss the natures in detail. From a historical perspective, there are many similarities between Jabir's theories and those of natural philosophers before him regarding the four natures; however, some of his claims raise the hypothesis that Jabir's theory is distinct, particularly in terms of the ontology of the natures. The basis of Jabir's view, influenced by his thoroughly pragmatic perspective, is that qualities are independent, embodied entities that, like physical materials, can combine with one another or be separated from each other. Nevertheless, this hypothesis—the distinctiveness and novelty of Jabir's claim—requires analyzing and comparing his detailed theories on the subject of natures with the prominent and well-known physical traditions preceding him, namely the Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic, and Neoplatonic traditions of natural philosophy. The main issue of this article is to explain the ontological status of the four natures in Jabir's thought and to assess the degree of its distinctiveness based on texts and content related to the subject.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106541_70c8676bf91eb821ce849ef1c6f676eb.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 The “Consistent ↔ Consistent” Model in Explaining the Relation Between a Consistent Cause and a Changing Effect: A Novel Formulation within Transcendent Theosophy with a Comparative Assessment of Spinoza The “Consistent ↔ Consistent” Model in Explaining the Relation Between a Consistent Cause and a Changing Effect: A Novel Formulation within Transcendent Theosophy with a Comparative Assessment of Spinoza 19 36 106833 10.48308/jipt.2026.241552.1680 FA Fatemeh Farzali Department of Theology Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 09 22 The problem of the relationship between a consistent cause and a changing effect is one of the fundamental knots of Islamic metaphysics and encounters difficulties in its common formulations. This study proposes a theoretical model of “consistent ↔ consistent” within the framework of the Transcendent Theosophy (ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyah) and, through a comparative assessment with Spinoza’s distinction between substance and modes, seeks to present a new argument for explaining this relation. The research method is analytical–argumentative with a comparative approach, grounded in principles such as the existential poverty of the effect, gradation in manifestation, the essential aspects (shuʾūn) of the Real, the rule of “no repetition in manifestation” (lā takrār fī al-tajallī), and the divine simplicity and all-encompassing sustenance (qayyūmiyya). According to this model, the cause remains simple and immutable at the level of essence, while the effect—by virtue of being pure relational existence (ʿayn al-ribṭ)—is consistent and complete in each “existential moment.” Thus, change occurs not in the foundational causal relation, but at the level of the succession of manifestations. The findings show that this formulation eliminates the difficulties of essential alteration in the cause and the problem of “preponderance without a preponderant cause,” and while affirming the doctrine of renewal of likes (tajaddud al-amthāl), it preserves identity-stability within the multiplicity of appearances. The comparative section also shows that, despite structural parallels with Spinoza’s model, this formulation differs significantly from his theological foundations, particularly regarding the immanence of the cause and his comprehensive necessitarianism. The problem of the relationship between a consistent cause and a changing effect is one of the fundamental knots of Islamic metaphysics and encounters difficulties in its common formulations. This study proposes a theoretical model of “consistent ↔ consistent” within the framework of the Transcendent Theosophy (ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyah) and, through a comparative assessment with Spinoza’s distinction between substance and modes, seeks to present a new argument for explaining this relation. The research method is analytical–argumentative with a comparative approach, grounded in principles such as the existential poverty of the effect, gradation in manifestation, the essential aspects (shuʾūn) of the Real, the rule of “no repetition in manifestation” (lā takrār fī al-tajallī), and the divine simplicity and all-encompassing sustenance (qayyūmiyya). According to this model, the cause remains simple and immutable at the level of essence, while the effect—by virtue of being pure relational existence (ʿayn al-ribṭ)—is consistent and complete in each “existential moment.” Thus, change occurs not in the foundational causal relation, but at the level of the succession of manifestations. The findings show that this formulation eliminates the difficulties of essential alteration in the cause and the problem of “preponderance without a preponderant cause,” and while affirming the doctrine of renewal of likes (tajaddud al-amthāl), it preserves identity-stability within the multiplicity of appearances. The comparative section also shows that, despite structural parallels with Spinoza’s model, this formulation differs significantly from his theological foundations, particularly regarding the immanence of the cause and his comprehensive necessitarianism.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106833_e2e08c19bcd0b01b55ce423b4ba22324.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 Revisiting the Status of Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy with an Emphasis on the Threefold Interpretations of the Theory of Causation Revisiting the Status of Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy with an Emphasis on the Threefold Interpretations of the Theory of Causation 37 56 106907 10.48308/jipt.2026.242306.1702 FA Eynollah Khadem . Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Shahid Rajaʾi Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran. Razieh Saber PhD Student, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Motahhari University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0002-6603-2307 Journal Article 2025 11 03 Hume's theory of causation has long been debated by commentators. As an empiricist, Hume rejects innate ideas and gives the imagination a central role in explaining causation. The three main interpretations of his work—skeptical, naturalistic, and projectivist—differ in their final reading of causation but all agree on the imagination's decisive role in forming causal beliefs. In the skeptical reading, causation is merely a product of habit and mental association, meaningless without imagination. In the naturalistic reading, human nature and imagination are inseparably linked. In projectivism, attributing causal necessity to the external world is an active projection of the mind. This research asks how these three interpretations reveal the fundamental role of imagination in Hume's thought. The findings show that in all three readings, imagination is a structural element in explaining causation. Hume thus transformed imagination from a passive faculty into an active, central agent in shaping knowledge. This shift marks the beginning of a development that paved the way for rethinking imagination's creative role in other domains. Hume's theory of causation has long been debated by commentators. As an empiricist, Hume rejects innate ideas and gives the imagination a central role in explaining causation. The three main interpretations of his work—skeptical, naturalistic, and projectivist—differ in their final reading of causation but all agree on the imagination's decisive role in forming causal beliefs. In the skeptical reading, causation is merely a product of habit and mental association, meaningless without imagination. In the naturalistic reading, human nature and imagination are inseparably linked. In projectivism, attributing causal necessity to the external world is an active projection of the mind. This research asks how these three interpretations reveal the fundamental role of imagination in Hume's thought. The findings show that in all three readings, imagination is a structural element in explaining causation. Hume thus transformed imagination from a passive faculty into an active, central agent in shaping knowledge. This shift marks the beginning of a development that paved the way for rethinking imagination's creative role in other domains.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106907_198d14ef39603f7145595dcfb09989c6.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 Critical Analysis of Mahdi Haʾeri Yazdi’s Interpretation of Mulla Sadra’s Response to the Problem of Mental Existence Based on the Distinction Between the Primary Essential Predication and the Common Technical predication Critical Analysis of Mahdi Haʾeri Yazdi’s Interpretation of Mulla Sadra’s Response to the Problem of Mental Existence Based on the Distinction Between the Primary Essential Predication and the Common Technical predication 57 72 106863 10.48308/jipt.2026.242503.1710 FA Hamid Reza Khademi Department of Philosophy and Theology, Institute for Research and Development of Humanities, "SAMT", Tehran, Iran. 0000-0002-2227-3830 Journal Article 2025 11 15 The issue of mental existence is counted among the fundamental topics in Islamic philosophy. The well‑known objection in this context concerns the union of two categories that are entirely disparate in essence within a single mental form. Throughout the history of philosophy, various thinkers have offered different responses to this objection. Mullā Ṣadrā, by distinguishing between two aspects of mental forms—based on the difference between primary essential predication (ḥaml‑i awwalī) and common technical predication (ḥaml‑i shāyiʿ-i ṣināʿī)—has attempted to provide a solution to this problem. This solution has been received positively and accepted by later philosophers and sages. Nevertheless, Mehdi Haʾeri Yazdi considers Ṣadrā’s answer incomplete and has attempted, in his works, to clarify the ambiguities within it. This article, employing an analytical‑comparative approach, first explicates Mullā Ṣadrā’s response, then examines Haʾeri Yazdi’s critiques, and finally, through a critical evaluation of his view, demonstrates that his criticisms of the Sadrian solution are not persuasive, and that Mullā Ṣadrā’s answer remains valid and well‑founded in the face of this problem. The issue of mental existence is counted among the fundamental topics in Islamic philosophy. The well‑known objection in this context concerns the union of two categories that are entirely disparate in essence within a single mental form. Throughout the history of philosophy, various thinkers have offered different responses to this objection. Mullā Ṣadrā, by distinguishing between two aspects of mental forms—based on the difference between primary essential predication (ḥaml‑i awwalī) and common technical predication (ḥaml‑i shāyiʿ-i ṣināʿī)—has attempted to provide a solution to this problem. This solution has been received positively and accepted by later philosophers and sages. Nevertheless, Mehdi Haʾeri Yazdi considers Ṣadrā’s answer incomplete and has attempted, in his works, to clarify the ambiguities within it. This article, employing an analytical‑comparative approach, first explicates Mullā Ṣadrā’s response, then examines Haʾeri Yazdi’s critiques, and finally, through a critical evaluation of his view, demonstrates that his criticisms of the Sadrian solution are not persuasive, and that Mullā Ṣadrā’s answer remains valid and well‑founded in the face of this problem.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106863_6c89b69eaa7f15b20c44f5a88a325e1f.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 Evaluating the factors influencing the formation of Dilthey's hermeneutic theory Evaluating the factors influencing the formation of Dilthey's hermeneutic theory 73 92 106786 10.48308/jipt.2026.241435.1673 FA Ali Niyazi Master in Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Mohammadreza Bayat Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 09 23 This article examines, using a descriptive–analytical method, the influence of German Romanticism, Hegelianism, historicism, and a critical approach to Kant’s philosophy on the formation of Dilthey’s hermeneutic theory. It shows that Dilthey borrowed from Romanticism an attention to the non‑rational dimensions of human life such as imagination and feeling; however, unlike the Romantics, he sought to develop a structured epistemological system for the human sciences. He also adopted from historicism the importance of historical contextuality, yet opposed relativism. Ultimately, through a critique of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Dilthey grounded his epistemology on a “critique of historical reason,” arguing that the categories of human understanding are not a priori but arise from lived and historically conditioned experience. Dilthey likewise regarded “lived experience” as the foundation of knowledge in the human sciences and, drawing on Hegel, employed the concept of “objective spirit” to explain intersubjective understanding. By evaluating the impact of each of these intellectual currents on the development of Dilthey’s hermeneutic theory, it can be concluded that the “critique and reinterpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy,” in relation to the other historical currents discussed, played the most significant role in shaping this theory. This article examines, using a descriptive–analytical method, the influence of German Romanticism, Hegelianism, historicism, and a critical approach to Kant’s philosophy on the formation of Dilthey’s hermeneutic theory. It shows that Dilthey borrowed from Romanticism an attention to the non‑rational dimensions of human life such as imagination and feeling; however, unlike the Romantics, he sought to develop a structured epistemological system for the human sciences. He also adopted from historicism the importance of historical contextuality, yet opposed relativism. Ultimately, through a critique of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Dilthey grounded his epistemology on a “critique of historical reason,” arguing that the categories of human understanding are not a priori but arise from lived and historically conditioned experience. Dilthey likewise regarded “lived experience” as the foundation of knowledge in the human sciences and, drawing on Hegel, employed the concept of “objective spirit” to explain intersubjective understanding. By evaluating the impact of each of these intellectual currents on the development of Dilthey’s hermeneutic theory, it can be concluded that the “critique and reinterpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy,” in relation to the other historical currents discussed, played the most significant role in shaping this theory.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106786_37aea6965461cb0510473d109411a0c3.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 Formulation of the Dimensions of Statehood in the Political Theology of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli: An Analysis Based on Skinner's Hermeneutics Formulation of the Dimensions of Statehood in the Political Theology of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli: An Analysis Based on Skinner's Hermeneutics 93 120 106601 10.48308/jipt.2025.241821.1692 FA Ali Aqajani Department of Political Science, Social Sciences Research Institute, Hawza and University Research Institute, Qom, Iran. 0000-0002-0328-2993 Journal Article 2025 10 18 This article focuses on the dimensions of “statehood” in political theology, centered on four fundamental axes: Islam and state legitimacy, Islam and democracy, Islam and secularism, and Islam and international relations. In Javadi Amoli’s intellectual framework, the Islamic state is not merely an executive institution but a cognitive, ethical, and civilizational structure that emerges in continuity with divine lordship, human vicegerency, and Qur’anic guidance. Its mission is not only administration, but also education, guidance, and the realization of human dignity. Socio‑political circumstances lead Javadi Amoli toward articulating a velayi (guardianship‑based) state, while his conceptual premises connect the state to general human vicegerency and civilizational guidance. Conventional norms regard legitimacy as divine, democracy as consultative, and international relations as justice‑centered. Javadi Amoli, through novel formulations, redefines the juristic domains of authority of the Guardian Jurist as an extension of epistemic Imamate, legitimacy as divine with popular acceptance, democracy as monotheistic and guided, and international relations as grounded in primordial monotheistic nature—while critiquing both Western instrumental reason and traditional absolute guardianship. He argues that the community’s acceptance of the Constitution, together with the leader’s acceptance of the responsibility of Imamate, forms a bilateral and binding covenant—one that constitutes a “valid contract,” a “necessary covenant,” and an “obligatory bond.” This indicates that Javadi Amoli’s political theology of statehood, being problem‑oriented and relatively comprehensive, reconstructs normative foundations and transforms the state into an ethical and civilization‑building institution. This article focuses on the dimensions of “statehood” in political theology, centered on four fundamental axes: Islam and state legitimacy, Islam and democracy, Islam and secularism, and Islam and international relations. In Javadi Amoli’s intellectual framework, the Islamic state is not merely an executive institution but a cognitive, ethical, and civilizational structure that emerges in continuity with divine lordship, human vicegerency, and Qur’anic guidance. Its mission is not only administration, but also education, guidance, and the realization of human dignity. Socio‑political circumstances lead Javadi Amoli toward articulating a velayi (guardianship‑based) state, while his conceptual premises connect the state to general human vicegerency and civilizational guidance. Conventional norms regard legitimacy as divine, democracy as consultative, and international relations as justice‑centered. Javadi Amoli, through novel formulations, redefines the juristic domains of authority of the Guardian Jurist as an extension of epistemic Imamate, legitimacy as divine with popular acceptance, democracy as monotheistic and guided, and international relations as grounded in primordial monotheistic nature—while critiquing both Western instrumental reason and traditional absolute guardianship. He argues that the community’s acceptance of the Constitution, together with the leader’s acceptance of the responsibility of Imamate, forms a bilateral and binding covenant—one that constitutes a “valid contract,” a “necessary covenant,” and an “obligatory bond.” This indicates that Javadi Amoli’s political theology of statehood, being problem‑oriented and relatively comprehensive, reconstructs normative foundations and transforms the state into an ethical and civilization‑building institution.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106601_95905eda1dbc14b06ab457a01adf23d8.pdf

Shahid Beheshti University The Mirror of Knowledge 2251-8010 26 1 2026 03 21 A Reflection on Aristotle's Definition of Moral Virtue and Its Components A Reflection on Aristotle's Definition of Moral Virtue and Its Components 121 138 106839 10.48308/jipt.2026.240442.1642 FA Amir Ahmadkhani Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Imam Sadiq University (AS), Tehran, Iran. Majid Ahsan Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Imam Sadiq University (AS), Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 07 07 Aristotle presents the concept of virtue in both epistemological and ontological layers. His primary concern is the ontology of virtue, or in other words, the formation of virtue and the process of becoming virtuous. However, this does not mean that the epistemological layer, which involves defining and understanding the nature of virtue, is neglected. According to Aristotle, virtue is a disposition that leads to choice, and this choice is composed of both desire and reflection. This study aims to analytically examine the nature of choice and discuss the relationship between desire and reflection in terms of priority and causality. Furthermore, the concept of virtue is closely tied to the doctrine of the mean, which has been critiqued from various perspectives. This research seeks to defend the doctrine of the mean by offering an interpretation that not only addresses criticisms regarding its metaphorical and practical shortcomings but also reconciles the quantitative and qualitative interpretations of the theory. Aristotle presents the concept of virtue in both epistemological and ontological layers. His primary concern is the ontology of virtue, or in other words, the formation of virtue and the process of becoming virtuous. However, this does not mean that the epistemological layer, which involves defining and understanding the nature of virtue, is neglected. According to Aristotle, virtue is a disposition that leads to choice, and this choice is composed of both desire and reflection. This study aims to analytically examine the nature of choice and discuss the relationship between desire and reflection in terms of priority and causality. Furthermore, the concept of virtue is closely tied to the doctrine of the mean, which has been critiqued from various perspectives. This research seeks to defend the doctrine of the mean by offering an interpretation that not only addresses criticisms regarding its metaphorical and practical shortcomings but also reconciles the quantitative and qualitative interpretations of the theory.

https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106839_1ecbe143f2fc31eac5a883081e021cdb.pdf