نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
گروه فلسفه و کلام، پژوهشکده تحقیق وتوسعه علوم انسانی (سمت)، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The issue of mental existence is counted among the fundamental topics in Islamic philosophy. The well‑known objection in this context concerns the union of two categories that are entirely disparate in essence within a single mental form. Throughout the history of philosophy, various thinkers have offered different responses to this objection. Mullā Ṣadrā, by distinguishing between two aspects of mental forms—based on the difference between primary essential predication (ḥaml‑i awwalī) and common technical predication (ḥaml‑i shāyiʿ-i ṣināʿī)—has attempted to provide a solution to this problem. This solution has been received positively and accepted by later philosophers and sages. Nevertheless, Mehdi Haʾeri Yazdi considers Ṣadrā’s answer incomplete and has attempted, in his works, to clarify the ambiguities within it. This article, employing an analytical‑comparative approach, first explicates Mullā Ṣadrā’s response, then examines Haʾeri Yazdi’s critiques, and finally, through a critical evaluation of his view, demonstrates that his criticisms of the Sadrian solution are not persuasive, and that Mullā Ṣadrā’s answer remains valid and well‑founded in the face of this problem.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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