https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/ The Mirror of Knowledge en daily 1 Sat, 21 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Sat, 21 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106990.html The existential dimensions and aspects of the human being, the way they relate to one another, and the ways they influence and are influenced by each other have long been acknowledged, at least theoretically, by thinkers and philosophers in both Islamic philosophy and Western philosophy. Accordingly, the examination of the relationship between the immaterial essence of the soul—distinct from the body and immortal—and its corporeal substance is among the issues that possess a long history in philosophical and theoretical discussions. Moreover, given that the immaterial essence of the soul comprises various faculties and dimensions such as imagination, estimation (wahm), the soul, the heart, and the intellect, the manner in which these psychic faculties relate to one another has been considered so significant—both from the standpoint of rational demonstration and, at times, experience—that it has consistently attracted the attention of philosophers, theologians, and mystics, prompting them to investigate and analyze these relationships.Among the questions raised in this regard are the following: What influence does the faculty of imagination exert on human knowledge of real and objective matters? To what extent does the existential domain of imagination shape our understanding of reality? Can the faculty of imagination mislead the intellect and affect it, and would this not ultimately lead to idealism? In the context of the association of ideas, what role does imagination play in the problem of causality? Is the attribution of causal necessity to the external world merely a projection of the mind and imagination, or is it demonstrable through rational proof? With regard to causality, how can the relation between a “consistent cause” and a “changing effect” be justified, and in principle what proportion exists between the consistent and the changing? To what extent are the notions of the ontological poverty of the effect, the effect as pure relation, gradation in manifestation, the essential modes of the Real, and the principle of lā takrār fī al‑tajallī (“no repetition in manifestation”)—as presented in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy and in Islamic mystical thought—capable of explaining this issue, and what relation or possible distinction do they have with the views of Spinoza? On the other hand, what effects do the faculties of the soul have in issues such as epistemology and mental existence? How can the conjunction of two mutually distinct categories (substance and accident) within the form of a single mental representation be analyzed? Is Mullā Ṣadrā’s explanation in the domain of predication—through the distinction between essential primary predication (ḥaml al‑awwalī al‑dhātī) and common technical predication (ḥaml al‑shāyiʿ al‑ṣināʿī)—helpful in clarifying this matter?What relationship do the faculties of the soul have with hermeneutics and the human interpretation of texts? How are Romanticism, Hegelianism, and Dilthey connected with the non‑rational dimensions of the human being, such as imagination and feeling, and what impact do they have on the formation of epistemic frameworks for the humanities? Does the influence of non‑rational faculties in hermeneutics lead to relativism in this field?In this issue, in addition to the topics mentioned above, the concept of virtue in Aristotle’s thought—examined at both ontological and epistemological levels, as well as the process by which human beings become virtuous through desire and reflection—has been discussed. Furthermore, the theory of the four natures in the thought of Jābir ibn Ḥayyān has also been explored. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106541.html The four natures hold a special and important place in the natural philosophy theories of Jabir ibn Hayyan, to the extent that his natural philosophy can be termed "the physics of natures." Few primary texts attributed to Jabir can be found that do not discuss the natures in detail. From a historical perspective, there are many similarities between Jabir's theories and those of natural philosophers before him regarding the four natures; however, some of his claims raise the hypothesis that Jabir's theory is distinct, particularly in terms of the ontology of the natures. The basis of Jabir's view, influenced by his thoroughly pragmatic perspective, is that qualities are independent, embodied entities that, like physical materials, can combine with one another or be separated from each other. Nevertheless, this hypothesis—the distinctiveness and novelty of Jabir's claim—requires analyzing and comparing his detailed theories on the subject of natures with the prominent and well-known physical traditions preceding him, namely the Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic, and Neoplatonic traditions of natural philosophy. The main issue of this article is to explain the ontological status of the four natures in Jabir's thought and to assess the degree of its distinctiveness based on texts and content related to the subject. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106833.html The problem of the relationship between a consistent cause and a changing effect is one of the fundamental knots of Islamic metaphysics and encounters difficulties in its common formulations. This study proposes a theoretical model of “consistent ↔ consistent” within the framework of the Transcendent Theosophy (ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyah) and, through a comparative assessment with Spinoza’s distinction between substance and modes, seeks to present a new argument for explaining this relation.  The research method is analytical–argumentative with a comparative approach, grounded in principles such as the existential poverty of the effect, gradation in manifestation, the essential aspects (shuʾūn) of the Real, the rule of “no repetition in manifestation” (lā takrār fī al-tajallī), and the divine simplicity and all-encompassing sustenance (qayyūmiyya). According to this model, the cause remains simple and immutable at the level of essence, while the effect—by virtue of being pure relational existence (ʿayn al-ribṭ)—is consistent and complete in each “existential moment.” Thus, change occurs not in the foundational causal relation, but at the level of the succession of manifestations.  The findings show that this formulation eliminates the difficulties of essential alteration in the cause and the problem of “preponderance without a preponderant cause,” and while affirming the doctrine of renewal of likes (tajaddud al-amthāl), it preserves identity-stability within the multiplicity of appearances. The comparative section also shows that, despite structural parallels with Spinoza’s model, this formulation differs significantly from his theological foundations, particularly regarding the immanence of the cause and his comprehensive necessitarianism.  https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106907.html Hume's theory of causation has long been debated by commentators. As an empiricist, Hume rejects innate ideas and gives the imagination a central role in explaining causation. The three main interpretations of his work—skeptical, naturalistic, and projectivist—differ in their final reading of causation but all agree on the imagination's decisive role in forming causal beliefs. In the skeptical reading, causation is merely a product of habit and mental association, meaningless without imagination. In the naturalistic reading, human nature and imagination are inseparably linked. In projectivism, attributing causal necessity to the external world is an active projection of the mind. This research asks how these three interpretations reveal the fundamental role of imagination in Hume's thought. The findings show that in all three readings, imagination is a structural element in explaining causation. Hume thus transformed imagination from a passive faculty into an active, central agent in shaping knowledge. This shift marks the beginning of a development that paved the way for rethinking imagination's creative role in other domains. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106863.html The issue of mental existence is counted among the fundamental topics in Islamic philosophy. The well‑known objection in this context concerns the union of two categories that are entirely disparate in essence within a single mental form. Throughout the history of philosophy, various thinkers have offered different responses to this objection. Mullā Ṣadrā, by distinguishing between two aspects of mental forms—based on the difference between primary essential predication (ḥaml‑i awwalī) and common technical predication (ḥaml‑i shāyiʿ-i ṣināʿī)—has attempted to provide a solution to this problem. This solution has been received positively and accepted by later philosophers and sages. Nevertheless, Mehdi Haʾeri Yazdi considers Ṣadrā’s answer incomplete and has attempted, in his works, to clarify the ambiguities within it. This article, employing an analytical‑comparative approach, first explicates Mullā Ṣadrā’s response, then examines Haʾeri Yazdi’s critiques, and finally, through a critical evaluation of his view, demonstrates that his criticisms of the Sadrian solution are not persuasive, and that Mullā Ṣadrā’s answer remains valid and well‑founded in the face of this problem. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106786.html This article examines, using a descriptive–analytical method, the influence of German Romanticism, Hegelianism, historicism, and a critical approach to Kant’s philosophy on the formation of Dilthey’s hermeneutic theory. It shows that Dilthey borrowed from Romanticism an attention to the non‑rational dimensions of human life such as imagination and feeling; however, unlike the Romantics, he sought to develop a structured epistemological system for the human sciences. He also adopted from historicism the importance of historical contextuality, yet opposed relativism. Ultimately, through a critique of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Dilthey grounded his epistemology on a “critique of historical reason,” arguing that the categories of human understanding are not a priori but arise from lived and historically conditioned experience. Dilthey likewise regarded “lived experience” as the foundation of knowledge in the human sciences and, drawing on Hegel, employed the concept of “objective spirit” to explain intersubjective understanding. By evaluating the impact of each of these intellectual currents on the development of Dilthey’s hermeneutic theory, it can be concluded that the “critique and reinterpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy,” in relation to the other historical currents discussed, played the most significant role in shaping this theory. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106601.html This article focuses on the dimensions of “statehood” in political theology, centered on four fundamental axes: Islam and state legitimacy, Islam and democracy, Islam and secularism, and Islam and international relations. In Javadi Amoli’s intellectual framework, the Islamic state is not merely an executive institution but a cognitive, ethical, and civilizational structure that emerges in continuity with divine lordship, human vicegerency, and Qur’anic guidance. Its mission is not only administration, but also education, guidance, and the realization of human dignity. Socio‑political circumstances lead Javadi Amoli toward articulating a velayi (guardianship‑based) state, while his conceptual premises connect the state to general human vicegerency and civilizational guidance. Conventional norms regard legitimacy as divine, democracy as consultative, and international relations as justice‑centered. Javadi Amoli, through novel formulations, redefines the juristic domains of authority of the Guardian Jurist as an extension of epistemic Imamate, legitimacy as divine with popular acceptance, democracy as monotheistic and guided, and international relations as grounded in primordial monotheistic nature—while critiquing both Western instrumental reason and traditional absolute guardianship. He argues that the community’s acceptance of the Constitution, together with the leader’s acceptance of the responsibility of Imamate, forms a bilateral and binding covenant—one that constitutes a “valid contract,” a “necessary covenant,” and an “obligatory bond.” This indicates that Javadi Amoli’s political theology of statehood, being problem‑oriented and relatively comprehensive, reconstructs normative foundations and transforms the state into an ethical and civilization‑building institution. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106839.html Aristotle presents the concept of virtue in both epistemological and ontological layers. His primary concern is the ontology of virtue, or in other words, the formation of virtue and the process of becoming virtuous. However, this does not mean that the epistemological layer, which involves defining and understanding the nature of virtue, is neglected. According to Aristotle, virtue is a disposition that leads to choice, and this choice is composed of both desire and reflection. This study aims to analytically examine the nature of choice and discuss the relationship between desire and reflection in terms of priority and causality. Furthermore, the concept of virtue is closely tied to the doctrine of the mean, which has been critiqued from various perspectives. This research seeks to defend the doctrine of the mean by offering an interpretation that not only addresses criticisms regarding its metaphorical and practical shortcomings but also reconciles the quantitative and qualitative interpretations of the theory. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106944.html The crisis of meaning in the contemporary world is rooted more in the disconnect between individual consciousness and ontological order than in biological challenges. This comparative study examines the philosophical systems of Baruch Spinoza and Allameh Tabatabai as two distinct responses to this crisis. Findings indicate that while both thinkers agree on the necessity of overcoming “ignorance of one’s position” to achieve meaning, their proposed paths lead to distinct horizons. Emphasizing immanent necessity and the dissolution of individuality in the “intellectual love of God,” Spinoza portrays a static meaning based on accepting nature’s governing necessity. In contrast, relying on the graded unity of existence and transubstantial motion, Tabatabai views meaning as a process of “becoming” and active perfection toward the Absolute Truth. This article’s innovation lies in proposing the “active acceptance” model; a paradigm where the tranquility derived from understanding Spinozan necessity serves not as an endpoint, but as an infrastructure for the perfectionist passion and movement toward the divine encounter in Tabatabai’s thought. This synthesis provides a comprehensive alternative for modern humanity to establish a meaningful balance between the determinism of laws and the desire for transcendence. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_106988.html Sigmund Freud, through a psychological approach, identifies the cause of religion’s emergence as human-made, the cause of the tendency toward it as ignorance and fear of natural phenomena, and the cause of the necessity of this tendency as a temporary need for psychological calm. Using a descriptive-analytical method and distinguishing three meanings of the “origin of religion,” the present study critiques Freud’s theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. Findings show that Freud’s theory faces fundamental critiques in all three areas: regarding the cause of emergence, Freud neglects religion’s trans-material dimensions, reducing it to a human phenomenon. Regarding the cause of tendency, historical and scriptural evidence contradicts the ignorance-and-fear theory; prophets and saints were the most knowledgeable and courageous people of their time, and the main cause of tendency toward religion is divine innate nature (fitrah). Regarding the necessity of tendency, the need for religion is permanent, not temporary; thus, Freud’s prediction of religion’s decline with scientific progress has not materialized. In contrast, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, based on an Islamic worldview, considers religion’s origin as God’s will, the cause of tendency as fitrah, and the cause of the necessity of tendency as humanity’s fundamental and permanent needs. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_107003.html This study uses a descriptive-analytical method to critically examine the use of apocalyptic narratives, especially narratives derived from a specific branch of Christian fatalism, as a theological justification for preemptive military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program. The main question of the study is: What role did Armageddon theology play in the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities? The study is based on the main hypothesis that the use of apocalyptic theology and the invocation of “Armageddon” (the final battle in the Book of Revelation) to defend and justify a military attack on independent and sovereign countries indicates a fundamental misunderstanding and instrumentalization of sacred texts that transforms theological beliefs about the end of the world into dangerous political tools. The study concludes that the Armageddon narrative, when used as a tool in foreign policy, dangerously undermines legal and moral norms. The research findings demonstrate that military action against emerging threats, invoking religious symbols, undermines the principle of the prohibition of the use of force, weakens the collective security system, undermines multilateral mechanisms, and destabilizes the international legal order. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_107011.html The Islamic theological school, by accepting the principle of ủzli separation and recognizing the typological and structural difference between the existence of things and the Existence of God, has interpreted God's coexistence with creatures in a scientific-powerful manner; that is, in terms of scientific coexistence, God has comprehension on beings and has knowledge to them. But from Mủlla Sadrả's perspective, and based on principles such as the originality of existence, the simple reality, and the negation of numerical unity, this verse offers a deeper understanding of God's relationship with creatures and explains the relationship between God and creatures in an existential way. In this research, by using the descriptive-analytical method, the issue of coexistence in the thoughts of Imamiyyả theologians and Sadrian wisdom from verse 7 of Surah Al-Mujadala is explained and investigated. Although Mủlla Sadrả agrees with theologians in accepting scientific coexistence, he believes that God, because of His existential flow in all aspects of creatures, has existential coexistence with every creature, and that although God is with creatures, He is free from their existential imperfections. Mủlla Sadrả's existential coexistence proves the pure neediness identity of creatures to God. https://jipt.sbu.ac.ir/article_107061.html The problem of horrendous evils, particularly within the context of devastating wars and collective violence, has long been recognized as a “stumbling block” for faith and the most challenging riddle for monotheistic theology. The profound gap between the expectation of Divine Intervention to aid the oppressed and the historical reality of Divine Silence amidst slaughter raises a question that extends beyond abstract philosophy of religion, touching the very core of the victims’ lived experience. Adopting an analytic-phenomenological method and a comparative approach between Post-Holocaust Theology and Islamic Wisdom, this research attempts to propose the hypothesis of “Strategic Absence” as an alternative to traditional theodicy explanations. The findings indicate that classical Augustinian-Thomistic theology, by reducing war to a mere “trial” or “chastisement,” inadvertently suspends human moral agency under the shadow of Divine Providence. In contrast, by critically re-examining the concept of “Divine Hiddenness” and referencing the Quranic doctrine of “Tadafu” (2:251), this study argues that God’s silence in war is not a sign of indifference, but rather the ontological condition for realizing human “radical responsibility.” In this paradigm, peace is not a metaphysical gift bestowed via miracle, but a human project meaningful precisely in the absence of direct divine intervention.