Analyzing and Criticizing Jesse Prinz's Point of View on Instinctive Nature of Morality

Document Type : Scientific-research

Author

assistant professor of Tehran university

Abstract

The present article is aimed to support the instinctive nature of morality. To this end it is necessary to respond to the arguments made by the opponents. Jesse Prinz, a Professor of philosophy, has tried to deny the innateness of moral norms with the help of some arguments. Understanding Prinz's approach is based on an awareness of the way he looks at the truth and nature of the moral norms and their origins. He believes that the psychological phenotype of P is innate when it is achieved by P-specific psychological mechanisms. He also considers moral norms to be influenced by emotions. The present study seeks to defend the innate nature of morality by responding to Prinz’s arguments through a brief explanation of his view on the true nature and the origin of moral norms and the denial of the instinctiveness of such norms and levelling some
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*  University of Tehran                                muhammadimunfared@ut.ac.ir
 
 Reception date:  99/2/9                          Acceptance date: 99/10/2
 
 
criticisms against them. The critique draws on Susan Dwyer and Chandra Srippada views on this issue. The conclusion is that the innate nature of most moral norms is more defendable, although some moral norms are not innate.

Keywords

References

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