A critique on epistemological basics of eliminative materialism

Document Type : Scientific-research

Authors

1 PhD student, University of Isfahan

2 prof. philosophyFaculty member of Isfahan University

Abstract

The eliminative materialism does not accept behavior explanation based on mental states and puts emphasis that human behavior should be explained just based nervous events. The supporter of this view, for the rejection of belief in mental states, call folk view which is against neuroscience. The following article, through the analysis of the epistemological basics of eliminative materialism, shown that this view is somehow an unreasonable monopoly of ontology. It will also be arguing that with defying the existence of mental state, not only there will be no space for psychology as a scientific and practical section, there is also no place for the key concepts of social sciences. Scientific psychology goes forward with assuming the existence of individuals in the social world of life and assumption which is the formation of psychology is scientific cannot interpreted in a physicalist way.Theaffirmative claim of this article is the fact that human nature can be understood deeply just through the interaction of psychology and neuroscience. Belief in immaterial mental states is not against neuroscience or other experiments sciences and definition based onimmaterial soul is an unmatchedand coherent ontological basis to defend scientific psychology.

Keywords


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