نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام پژوهشکده تحقیق و توسعه علوم انسانی (سمت)
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Abstract
The issue of mental existence constitutes one of the fundamental and intricate debates within Islamic philosophy. The central problem arises from the apparent union of two distinct categories—real and mental—within a single cognitive form. Throughout the history of Islamic thought, numerous philosophers have endeavored to address this philosophical paradox. Among them, Mulla Sadra proposed an innovative solution by distinguishing between two levels of mental form, grounded in the difference between tautological predication and common technical predication. His interpretation was widely acknowledged and adopted by later philosophers.
However, Mahdi Haeri Yazdi considered Mulla Sadra’s account insufficient and attempted to clarify its ambiguities in his own philosophical works. Employing an analytical–comparative method, this paper first explicates Mulla Sadra’s position on the problem of mental existence, then critically examines Haeri Yazdi’s objections. Finally, through a critical reassessment, it argues that Haeri Yazdi’s criticisms lack sufficient justification and that Mulla Sadra’s response remains both coherent and philosophically defensible.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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