سخن سردبیر

The existential dimensions and aspects of the human being, the way they relate to one another, and the ways they influence and are influenced by each other have long been acknowledged, at least theoretically, by thinkers and philosophers in both Islamic philosophy and Western philosophy. Accordingly, the examination of the relationship between the immaterial essence of the soul—distinct from the body and immortal—and its corporeal substance is among the issues that possess a long history in philosophical and theoretical discussions. Moreover, given that the immaterial essence of the soul comprises various faculties and dimensions such as imagination, estimation (wahm), the soul, the heart, and the intellect, the manner in which these psychic faculties relate to one another has been considered so significant—both from the standpoint of rational demonstration and, at times, experience—that it has consistently attracted the attention of philosophers, theologians, and mystics, prompting them to investigate and analyze these relationships.
Among the questions raised in this regard are the following: What influence does the faculty of imagination exert on human knowledge of real and objective matters? To what extent does the existential domain of imagination shape our understanding of reality? Can the faculty of imagination mislead the intellect and affect it, and would this not ultimately lead to idealism? In the context of the association of ideas, what role does imagination play in the problem of causality? Is the attribution of causal necessity to the external world merely a projection of the mind and imagination, or is it demonstrable through rational proof? With regard to causality, how can the relation between a “consistent cause” and a “changing effect” be justified, and in principle what proportion exists between the consistent and the changing? To what extent are the notions of the ontological poverty of the effect, the effect as pure relation, gradation in manifestation, the essential modes of the Real, and the principle of lā takrār fī al‑tajallī (“no repetition in manifestation”)—as presented in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy and in Islamic mystical thought—capable of explaining this issue, and what relation or possible distinction do they have with the views of Spinoza? On the other hand, what effects do the faculties of the soul have in issues such as epistemology and mental existence? How can the conjunction of two mutually distinct categories (substance and accident) within the form of a single mental representation be analyzed? Is Mullā Ṣadrā’s explanation in the domain of predication—through the distinction between essential primary predication (ḥaml al‑awwalī al‑dhātī) and common technical predication (ḥaml al‑shāyiʿ al‑ṣināʿī)—helpful in clarifying this matter?
What relationship do the faculties of the soul have with hermeneutics and the human interpretation of texts? How are Romanticism, Hegelianism, and Dilthey connected with the non‑rational dimensions of the human being, such as imagination and feeling, and what impact do they have on the formation of epistemic frameworks for the humanities? Does the influence of non‑rational faculties in hermeneutics lead to relativism in this field?
In this issue, in addition to the topics mentioned above, the concept of virtue in Aristotle’s thought—examined at both ontological and epistemological levels, as well as the process by which human beings become virtuous through desire and reflection—has been discussed. Furthermore, the theory of the four natures in the thought of Jābir ibn Ḥayyān has also been explored.