نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار، گروه فلسفه اسلامی، مدرسه حکمت و ادیان، جامعة المصطفی العالمیة، قم، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah, a prominent work by Ṭabāṭabā'ī, is one of the most significant philosophical texts in contemporary Islamic thought, in which fundamental philosophical issues are examined with remarkable precision. Over the years, this work has been met with various interpretations and critiques, among the most notable of which are the annotations of Professor Fayyāḍī. Among these, critiques such as the objection to the selection of the title for the section on knowledge, doubts regarding 'Allāmah's argument in proving presential knowledge based on individuation, and critiques of 'Allāmah's definitions of presential and acquired knowledge and the manner in which acquired knowledge reduces to presential knowledge, indicate methodological differences between these two thinkers. The present article critically and analytically examines these critiques and endeavors to clarify that Professor Fayyāḍī's critiques, despite their scholarly rigor, cannot in some instances undermine the validity of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī's views.
Keywords: Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah, Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Fayyāḍī, Epistemology, Knowledge.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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