نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
دکتری فلسفهی اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامیدانشگاه قم، قم، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
One of the main problems in the field of conventional cognitions is their lack of productive connection with real (ḥaqīqī) perceptions, as proposed by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. Based on this view, the logical derivation of real propositions from conventional ones—and vice versa—is denied. The main rationale lies in the mutability of conventional cognitions, the stability of real perceptions, and the absence of an ontological (nafs al-ʾamrī) connection between subject and predicate in conventional judgments. According to the present study’s analysis, from the perspective of formal logic, inference in certain cases involving both types of cognitions is unproblematic. The lack of an ontological basis does not eliminate logical relations either among conventional propositions themselves or between them and real ones. Moreover, although the materials of arguments in conventional cognitions are not certain, the use of certain premises becomes feasible if stable conventions are assumed. Also, if both the major premise and the conclusion are conventional, their changeable nature poses no problem so long as the convention in the major premise remains.
کلیدواژهها [English]