The prevalent interpretation of Allameh Mesbah Yazdi's thought, based on the theory of "necessity-by-relation" (ḍarūrat bil-qiyās), generally regards value concepts—whether in the predicate or subject position—as entirely "philosophical secondary intelligibles, on the grounds that they signify mind-independent relations between an act and its consequence. The present study, employing a descriptive-analytical method and emphasizing the apparent wording in Allameh Mesbah's works, aims to revisit this view more precisely. The findings of this research indicate that within the epistemological framework of Allameh Mesbah, value concepts possess a "dual-aspect" (two-layered) structure: 1. With respect to their "source of abstraction" (mansha‘ al-intizā‘) and "criterion of truth" (mīzān al-ṣidq), they rely on causal relations (necessity-by-relation)—a point of commonality with philosophical intelligibles. 2. However, in terms of their "conceptual structure" and "function," they possess characteristics such as "being derivative" (‘āriyatī), "being symbolic," "being bound by human constraints," and having an "imperative form" (qālab inshā‘ī), which are not found in pure philosophical intelligibles. By formulating these characteristics, this article seeks to explore the possibility of accepting a distinct type of universal concept, emphasizing Allameh Mesbah's thought—a unified concept deemed necessary for accurately explaining the transition from "is" to "ought" and reconciling moral realism with imperative language.