Personal identity within physical resurrection remains a fundamental issue in Islamic theology, as divine reward, punishment, and the realization of afterlife justice necessitate the presence of the same responsible subject on the Day of Resurrection. The core theological challenge involves explaining the unity between the worldly person and the resurrected individual, despite the physical dissolution at death. This study utilizes a comparative approach to evaluate the explanations of Sayyid al-Murtada and Sheikh al-Tusi and their implications. Findings show both scholars regard man as a physical, responsible being, maintaining resurrection constitutes the return of the original subject of worldly actions, rather than the survival of a disembodied soul. Sayyid al-Murtada grounds this personal identity in the restoration of the original human constituent parts, effectively addressing doubts concerning physical changes. Sheikh Tusi’s account appears more comprehensive; however, he fails to provide an explicit criterion distinguishing the restoration of the identical person from the reconstruction of a similar one.